Month: December 2023

Drivers of (In)equity in Collaborative Environmental Governance

by Kristin Babson Dobbin

In recent decades, collaborative governance has reshaped environmental policy by encouraging horizontal cooperation among stakeholders in an effort to create more mutually beneficial, locally appropriate policies. However, despite its potential advantages, there is a lack of empirical evaluation of the approach, particularly regarding equity. Our study focuses on California’s groundwater management overhaul, known as the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), to examine the conditions under which equity is or is not promoted in collaborative processes.

The chronic groundwater management challenges in California, especially in the San Joaquin Valley, contribute to the state’s widespread drinking water inequities disproportionately affecting low-income rural communities. The severe drought from 2012 to 2016 exacerbated these issues, leading to the implementation of SGMA. Under SGMA, local agencies formed Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) to manage groundwater and develop Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs) addressing undesirable groundwater outcomes. Our study analyzes GSPs in critically overdrafted basins to assess their impact on vulnerable drinking water users and environmental justice communities.

We derive five hypotheses for factors influencing equity in collaborative governance derived from the existing literature— the extent of collaboration, representation, elite capture, stakeholder engagement, and problem severity/salience. We then test these hypotheses using Boosted Regression and Classification Trees (BRCT) comparing results across three models, each with a distinct measure of drinking water equity used as the dependent variable. 

Across all three models, our results support the hypotheses, underscoring the importance of collaboration, representation, elite capture, stakeholder engagement, and problem severity/salience in influencing the distribution of benefits, costs, and risks for vulnerable drinking water users in groundwater plans(see Figure 1). Nonetheless, the raw change in the dependent variables associated with these factors is in most cases quite limited. For example, when moving from zero to eighty percent representation for drinking water users on the GSA board of directors, we only predict a six-percentage point increase in environmental justice rubric score from 40.65 to 46.60. Thus, we assert additional interventions beyond the scope of the factors studied herein are likely essential if we are to increase social equity in decentralized collaborative decision making. 

Comparing the influence of these five factors within and among the models lends additional important insights. Among them, our findings suggest that it might be easier to improve equity in the distribution of collaborative governance benefits than in the distribution of risks or burdens. Also notable is that across equity measures, representation in decision-making roles is consistently more influential than traditional stakeholder engagement. Finally,  given that many of the estimated associations are nonlinear, our findings underscore the importance of addressing threshold effects and optima, rather than presence or absence, when seeking to advance specific collaborative outcomes.

Future research should focus on a nuanced understanding of local institutional design as well as the potential role of external linkages with outside organizations given that some research indicates they may increase accountability. Such work can help us understand the potential and limits of collaborative governance for ensuring positive environmental outcomes for all.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Dobbin, Kristin Babson, Kuo, Michael, Lubell, Mark, Bostic, Darcy, Mendoza, Jessica, and Echeveste, Ernest 2023. “ Drivers of (in)equity in collaborative environmental governance”. Policy Studies Journal 51, 375–395. https://doi-org.echo.louisville.edu/10.1111/psj.12483

About the Authors

Kristin Dobbin (she/her) is an assistant professor of cooperative extension in water justice policy and planning at UC Berkeley in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management. Her work focuses on understanding the causes of, and solutions to, drinking water inequities in California. Kristin holds a PhD from the University of California Davis and was a NSF Social, Behavior and Economic Sciences postdoctoral fellow at UCLA.

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Measuring the Stasis: Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Partisan Polarization

by Clare Brock & Daniel Mallinson

Gridlock and partisan polarization are popularly blamed for every American social and political ill–from the inability of Congress to pass much needed policy reform on a variety of issues, to the inefficacy of bureaucracy, to the divisive rhetoric espoused in presidential debates. The headlines are not inaccurate in their assessment of the division and dysfunction that currently plagues American politics; however, they do not tell the entire story either.

Partisan polarization and gridlock are always high salience, high attention problems. But they do not operate the same way across all policy areas, nor is it appropriate to explain all outcomes (or lack thereof) in terms of these two phenomena. Total gridlock as a result of polarization, for example, is simply not an accurate way to describe American governance. Congress does pass important legislation, including, but not limited to, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, and the 2010 Affordable Care Act. In short, Congress can legislate. The question is then, when and on what issues can Congress act, and why does it seem so incapable of moving forward on so many other issues?

In “Measuring the stasis: Punctuated equilibrium theory and partisan polarization,” we use punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) to explore the role of partisan polarization in a stop-and-go policy process. PET predicts that the policy process is characterized by long periods of stability (gridlock), interspersed with brief periods of drastic change. In other words, the policy process is neither completely gridlocked, nor is it incremental; rather, policymaking tends to be alternatively highly stable and highly volatile. The degree of volatility is, in part, a function of how much friction is built into the governing system. Higher levels of friction will mean a more extreme pattern of punctuation – longer periods of stasis, but also, larger policy changes when sufficient pressure does build up to generate change.

We look at partisan polarization as a source of increasing friction in the political system, relying on annual data from federal budget authority and the passage of public laws from the Comparative Agendas Project to capture policy change, and NOMINATE scores that measure partisan polarization. These data stretch from 1948 to 2020 and allow us to evaluate how partisan polarization has affected budget-making and public law passage across multiple policy areas over the years.

Figure 1 shows the trends over time in partisan polarization (it is increasing) and budgetary and public law kurtosis. Kurtosis is a common way to measure the degree of policy punctuation. When it is high, there are long periods of incremental changes (i.e., stasis) that are punctuated by large policy changes. The higher the kurtosis, the more extreme the pattern of stasis and punctuation. As indicated by the trend lines, partisan polarization has been steadily rising since the 1960s, but underwent a considerable jump during the mid-1990s and again in the early-2000s. Likewise, while budget kurtosis was high in the 1950s and 60s, it dropped for the next two decades before a large and rapid increase between 1996 and 2012. Public law kurtosis remained steady until the 199s when it increased and then became more volatile. Notably, these dynamics settled back down after 2012.

Figure 1: Changes in U.S. National Government budget kurtosis and congressional polarization, 1957–2020.

Much like the increased budgetary kurtosis and declining passage of public laws illustrated in Figure 1, the same results were found when controlling for the presence of divided government (i.e., when one party controls the Presidency and the other controls at least one chamber of Congress). In other words, the observed effects were most likely caused by the increase in polarization and not by other political factors expected to cause gridlock. This suggests that polarization has contributed to a more volatile policy process, with prolonged periods of stasis and reactively large moments of change.

It is worth noting that there were differences in these effects depending on the policy area. For example, polarization seemed to increase volatility more in energy policy than in transportation policy. Future research could do more to investigate the nuances uncovered in our analysis, and we hope that scholars will continue examining how polarization impacts our society.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Brock, Clare and Mallinson, Daniel. 2023. “Measuring the Stasis: Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Partisan Polarization.” Policy Studies Journal 00(0): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12519.

About the Authors

Clare Brock is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University. Her research interests include public policy process, interest groups and advocacy, food politics, and the impact of polarization on policymaking.


Daniel J. Mallinson is an Associate Professor of Public Policy and Administration at Penn State Harrisburg. His research interests include policy process theory (particularly policy diffusion and punctuated equilibrium theory), cannabis policy, energy policy, and the science of teaching and learning.

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“Mobile Shooting”: The Shifting Anticorruption Attention in China

by Jing Vivian Zhan & Jiangnan Zhu

Anticorruption agencies in authoritarian regimes are constrained by scant resources, particularly attention. Attention is the prime scarce resource in governing; it guides the flow of other resources, such as budgets and manpower. Therefore, the allocation of anticorruption attention becomes especially important in influencing both the allocation of corresponding resources and the level of corruption control in authoritarian countries. Existing research has told us to some extent when authoritarian leaders may pay more attention to certain cases or corrupt officials due to political calculations. However, little is known about whether and how anticorruption agencies allocate their attention across policy areas in autocracies. This question warrants investigation because anticorruption programs targeting specific sectors treat the root causes of corruption more directly and are more effective than broad anticorruption policies.

Our article, “Policy Coordination and Selective Corruption Control in China,” answers this question by scrutinizing the case of China. An understudied facet of selective corruption control is that the Chinese procuratorate, the state judicial branch responsible for the investigation, prevention, and prosecution of corruption.  The procuratorate has constantly shifted its anticorruption attention across different policy sectors. Figure 1 visualizes this tendency.

Figure 1. Anticorruption Attention by Area (1998-2016)

Note: Policy areas are listed in descending order by the overall degree of anticorruption attention of each area (i.e., sum of anticorruption attention across years). Darker colors indicate more anticorruption attention.

The shifting attention is especially puzzling given the widespread corruption across Chinese industries and the low likelihood that serious sectoral corruption will be resolved once and for all.

We coin a theory of “cross-organizational policy coordination under a single-party authoritarian regime” to explain the puzzle: Single-party regimes can use the centralized party discipline and personnel management system as leverage to direct bureaucratic attention toward the signals given by top policymakers. The policy objectives prioritized by top leaders not only prompt the directly responsible functional sectors to act, but also motivate other bureaucracies, including anticorruption agencies, to coordinate their policies with the national agenda. Thus, the Chinese procuratorate has been mobilized to align anticorruption work with central policy agendas to facilitate the Chinese Communist Party’s major policy initiatives by preventing corruption and investigating more cases in those areas.

We test the correlation between anticorruption attention and policy significance, respectively measured by analyzing voluminous government documents. As shown in Figure 2, except in a few areas chronically ignored by the procurators between 1998 and 2016 (e.g., culture), anticorruption attention and policy significance have similar fluctuating patterns in most areas, with near-matching trend lines in areas such as land & real estate, state-owned enterprise, people’s livelihood, and work safety. Greater policy significance is usually accompanied by augmented anticorruption attention, whereas a steady decrease in policy significance often leads to reduced anticorruption attention.

Figure 2. Anticorruption Attention and Policy Significance by Area

Note: For each policy area, the horizontal axis is year; the vertical axis on the left and the red line represent anticorruption attention, while the vertical axis on the right and the green line represent policy significance.

We are among the first to explore authoritarian anticorruption enforcement from the perspective of attention allocation to policy issues. Our study brings a new perspective to understanding anticorruption endeavors in authoritarian regimes by showing that in addition to being motivated by political calculations such as elite power competition, single-party authoritarian regimes can strategically deploy anticorruption efforts as a policy tool to facilitate grand policy portfolios. Our findings resonated with research in predemocratic Brazil and Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, in which the state could use political appointments to instrumentalize regulatory bureaucracies with expertise to serve government policies.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Zhan, Jing Vivian, and Zhu, Jiangnan. 2023. Policy coordination and selective corruption control in China. Policy Studies Journal 51: 685–702. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12487

About the Authors

Jing Vivian Zhan is a Professor at the Department of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Email: zhan@cukh.edu.hk, Facebook: @Vivian Zhan, X: @jvzhan1


Jiangnan Zhu is an Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong.

Email: zhujn@hku.hk, Facebook: @Jiangnan Zhu, X: jian_nan_zhu

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