In 2013, Mexico passed a sweeping tax reform that, surprisingly, included measures to increase taxes on the wealthiest individuals and corporations—despite being led by a party often aligned with elite economic interests. A decade earlier, under similar institutional conditions and with widespread support from the business sector, a far more modest reform effort had collapsed. What explains this contrast?
My article tackles this puzzle by comparing two major reform efforts: President Vicente Fox’s failed 2001 attempt and President Enrique Peña Nieto’s successful 2013 overhaul. Despite similar levels of party fragmentation and legislative constraints, the outcomes were drastically different—not only in terms of success, but also in ideological orientation.
To make sense of these differences, I assess two major policy process theories: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). The ACF suggests that lasting policy change results from coalitions of actors united by deep normative commitments. Yet in Mexico, such ideological coherence was absent in 2013. Instead, I argue that policy entrepreneurs took advantage of fleeting political windows—exemplifying the kind of opportunistic “coupling of streams” Kingdon describes.
In 2001, Fox’s proposal to extend the Value Added Tax (VAT) to basic goods failed because the PRI—then the main opposition party—refused to pay the political cost, despite sharing the PAN’s economic preferences. And yet, the Income Tax portion of that bill passed unanimously, after PRD legislators accepted corporate-friendly provisions in exchange for key progressive concessions. This trade-off exemplified a strategic, if ideologically messy, compromise enabled by a temporary alignment of interests.
Fast forward to 2013, when PRI, back in power, launched a tax reform that defied expectations: it dropped controversial VAT expansions and instead raised income and capital taxes on top earners. The reform succeeded not due to ideological conviction, but because it was part of a broader legislative package negotiated under the “Pacto por México.” PRI’s flexibility—along with the PRD’s willingness to strike a deal—made it possible to capitalize on a narrow legislative opportunity.
This case shows that policy change—even in rigid institutional environments—does not always reflect stable coalitions or shared beliefs. Sometimes, it’s about seizing the moment.
You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at
Mena Aguilar, Oswaldo A. 2024. “ Advocacy Coalitions or Pragmatic Coupling of Streams? Explaining Policy Change in Mexico: The Tax Reforms of Vicente Fox and Enrique Peña (2001 and 2013).” Policy Studies Journal 00 (0): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12537.
About the Author
Oswaldo A. Mena is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His research focuses on comparative politics, political economy, and the political determinants of inequality, poverty, and redistributive politics and policies in Latin America. He is a Data Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino Studies and was a 2024 Junior Scholar of the Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality. He previously worked in Mexico’s public sector for nearly a decade.
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Immigration and the welfare state are often cast as adversaries in political debates. When immigration increases, concerns about overburdened social services frequently rise to the surface—especially during times of fiscal constraint. But is the relationship really that simple?
In my recent article, I argue that this question cannot be adequately answered without considering the role of the institutional framework and arrangements—specifically, the type of government in power.
Drawing on panel data from 28 advanced democracies between 1980 and 2019, I examine how immigration inflows interact with government types—single-party majority, coalition, and minority governments—to influence welfare spending. My findings show that the relationship between immigration and social expenditure is not uniform. While immigration alone does not have a consistent effect on welfare spending, its impact is significantly shaped by the type of government.
Coalition and minority governments – where power is more dispersed – are more likely to respond to immigration with increased welfare spending. This contrasts with single-party majority governments, which tend to be more cautious or even restrictive. The reasons are both institutional and political. In more fragmented governments, there are numerous veto players, and accountability is shared. This can shield pro-welfare and pro-immigration parties from electoral risks and dilute the policy influence of anti-immigrant sentiment.
By contrast, single-party majority governments, especially under growing public concern about immigration, may face stronger incentives to hold down spending. Parties in such governments are more directly accountable for all policy outcomes and may be wary of appearing “soft” on immigration in the eyes of median voters.
Real-world cases underscore these dynamics. In France, left parties in coalition governments have actively defended immigrants’ access to healthcare, despite political resistance. Meanwhile, in Denmark and the U.S., left-leaning single-party governments have in some instances moderated or even reversed their immigration-friendly positions in response to electoral pressure.
These findings illustrate a broader lesson: institutions matter. Political institutions determine how the government responds to social pressures and also condition whether immigration leads to policy expansion or retrenchment. Understanding these institutional filters is crucial for designing sustainable and inclusive social welfare policies in an era of increasing migration and political polarization.
You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at
Qi, Hang. 2025. “ Immigration, Government Type, and Social Welfare Spending.” Policy Studies Journal 00(0): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70015.
About the Author
Hang Qi is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau. His research focuses on the policy and politics of redistribution, immigration policy, fiscal policy, and political economy. His work has been published or is forthcoming in Policy Studies Journal, Public Opinion Quarterly, American Politics Research, and other journals.
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by Gregory Porumbescu, Stephanie Walsh, & Andrea Hetling
This study examines how lowering learning costs in means-tested benefit programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), influences public support and perceptions of beneficiary deservingness. Drawing on educational psychology research (cognitive load theory) and policy feedback theory, we investigate how the structure and clarity of information about SNAP’s eligibility and application process influence learning costs, public support, and attitudes. Through a pre-registered dose-response survey experiment, our findings show that improving the clarity of SNAP information reduces learning barriers, increasing support and positive perceptions of beneficiaries. This study is guided by two testable hypotheses:
Improved comprehension increases public support based on policy feedback theory.
To test these hypotheses, we performed a dose-response survey experiment involving 1,677 New Jersey residents. Participants were assigned randomly to one of four groups: a control group that was given no information, and three treatment groups that were given increasingly clearer and more structured information on SNAP. The treatments were:
Flyer: A low-structuring treatment with minimal structuring of content. Screener: A tool that breaks the content into bite-sized, manageable chunks, mimicking state-level eligibility screens. Video: A how-to tutorial walking participants through the eligibility process.
After being exposed to the treatment, each participant answered a series of questions related to SNAP, with the number of questions they answered correctly comprising the dependent variable, their SNAP comprehension score. To analyze the data, we employed a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to evaluate whether differences exist across the control and three treatment groups. We utilized planned contrasts to determine if the means differed significantly across each treatment group. To analyze the relationship between comprehension and program support measures, we used ordinary least squares regressions. The mediation framework improves upon traditional methods by leveraging the potential outcomes framework. By modeling intermediate pathways explicitly, this method offers improved estimates of indirect effects compared to the associations produced by standard mediation techniques.
Figure 2. Distribution of SNAP comprehension score by treatment group.
As shown in figure 2, providing structured, digestible information significantly enhances study participants’ knowledge. The video treatment group, which received the clearest presentation, had the highest comprehension levels, followed by the screener group. The flyer treatment group, with the least structured data, had the lowest comprehension. In addition, differences by participant racial identity emerged, as Black non-Hispanic participants show a stronger inverse relationship between SNAP understanding and perceived deservingness compared to other groups. These findings underscore the importance of comprehension in shaping attitudes toward SNAP policies.
Findings also revealed significant indirect effects on SNAP approval, perceived deservingness, and support for increased funding. Higher comprehension connects reduced learning costs to greater support. This indicates that simplifying information delivery about complex benefit programs can enhance public approval and engagement. These results align with policy feedback theory, highlighting the importance of accessible information in shaping support for means-tested policies such as SNAP.
Figure 3. Indirect effects of content structure on different aspects of SNAP support.
Empirically, the findings show that reducing learning costs not only improves knowledge but also increases support for programs like SNAP, improves positive perceptions of program beneficiaries, and draws support for program funding. These effects could carry over to other complex safety net programs like Temporary Assistance Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid, with policy communication implications extending beyond the reduction of learning cost.
You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at
Porumbescu, Gregory, Stephanie Walsh and Andrea Hetling. 2025. “ Can Reducing Learning Costs Improve Public Support For Means-tested Benefit Programs?.” Policy Studies Journal 53(1): 135–157. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12578.
About the Authors
Gregory Porumbescu (PhD, Seoul National University) is an associate professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the University of Georgia‘s School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA). His research centers on understanding the implications of technology for government transparency and accountability. Dr. Porumbescu‘s work has been published in journals such as the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration Review, Governance, and Social Science & Medicine. Prior to joining SPIA, Dr. Porumbescu served as an associate professor at Rutgers University–Newark. There, he was a co-founding principal investigator for the New Jersey State Policy Lab, an initiative dedicated to enhancing evidence based policy making in state governments. During his time at Rutgers, he was also appointed to serve on the AI, Equity, and Literacy Working Group, contributing to Governor Phil Murphy‘s New Jersey AI task force. Dr. Porumbescu‘s research has been supported by organizations such as the National Science Foundation, Korean Research Foundation, and the New Jersey Office of the Secretary of Higher Education.
Stephanie Walsh is Assistant Director of the Heldrich Center. She earned her doctorate in planning and public policy at Rutgers University. She also holds a Master‘s degree in public policy. Stephanie also serves as the Director of the New Jersey Statewide Data System, overseeing the governance, research agenda, and publications that use the linked longitudinal data. Her research interests focus on how data can inform public programs and policies to better support service delivery and improve individual outcomes.
Andrea Hetling is a Professor at the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. Dr. Hetling‘s research interests focus on how public programs and policies can support economic well-being and financial stability among vulnerable populations, including families living in poverty and survivors of intimate partner violence. In 2019, Andrea was selected as one of only five Family Self-Sufficiency and Stability Research Network (FSSRN) Scholars and awarded a five-year grant by the US Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. Before getting her Ph.D., Andrea worked as a program administrator at a domestic violence agency, focusing on advocacy and development issues. As a strong believer in the public impact of applied policy research, Andrea regularly connects her research projects with her teaching and mentoring and to her service to the greater community.
In many policy areas, powerful interest groups—such as labor unions or industry associations—shape and protect the status quo. When these vested interests have significant financial and political clout, how do policymakers manage to enact major reforms against their preferences? My paper examines this question through the lens of teacher evaluation policy in the U.S., revealing that advocacy groups play a crucial role in facilitating policy change by providing what I call policy subsidies: information, resources, and capacity that enable reform-minded policymakers to push past entrenched opposition.
My primary research question is: How are powerful interest groups with a stake in the status quo overcome? In the case of teacher evaluations, many states moved to incorporate student growth measures—often derived from standardized testing—as a sizable portion of their teacher evaluation systems despite fierce resistance from teachers’ unions. I investigate why some states were more successful than others in adopting and sustaining these reforms, focusing on the role of advocacy groups in supporting policy change.
Teachers’ unions have long been among the most influential state-level interest groups, using their financial resources and political leverage to shape education policy. Given their strength, it would be expected that states would avoid implementing teacher evaluations that include student achievement as a key factor. Yet, from 2009 to 2015, a growing number of states adopted such provisions. Why?
I argue that advocacy groups—such as education reform organizations—provided information (i.e., policy ideas, analysis, data) and capacity (i.e., time-consuming actions). I call these assets policy subsidies. By reducing the costs associated with enacting and implementing controversial reforms, policy subsidies can make it easier for policymakers to challenge vested interests and push through significant policy changes.
To test this theory, I conducted a 50-state quantitative analysis of teacher evaluation policymaking between 2010 and 2011 and case studies of Minnesota and Wisconsin, two states that took different policy paths. The study tested two primary hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: States where advocacy groups provide policy subsidies are more likely to implement policy change opposed by vested interests than those without such groups.
Hypothesis 2:States where those in power are open to change are more likely to implement significant policy change opposed by vested interests than those without such politicians in power.
My quantitative analysis showed that states where advocacy groups were active were significantly more likely to pass teacher evaluation reforms (see Figure 1). The effect of advocacy groups was strongest in states where Republicans controlled the legislature. In these states, advocacy groups helped craft policies that successfully incorporated student achievement as a “significant” factor in teacher evaluations (see Table 5). My case studies of Minnesota and Wisconsin illustrate this dynamic in action. In Minnesota, advocacy groups worked closely with Republican lawmakers to provide both technical policy assistance and political support, leading to the adoption of evaluation reforms. In contrast, Wisconsin—despite similar political conditions where Republicans were in control—lacked strong advocacy group engagement, and teacher evaluation reform was delegated to the bureaucracy, where, in the absence of advocacy group involvement, the student achievement provision was compromised during implementation..
This study demonstrates that interest group influence is not absolute; advocacy groups can play a decisive role in shifting policy outcomes by lowering the costs of reform, even where vested interests are strong. Additionally, having policymakers favorable to a particular policy is not enough to overcome vested interests— policymakers need interest group allies to help them craft and implement those policies that might otherwise be stopped in their tracks by powerful interest groups. The concept of policy subsidies extends beyond education, offering insights into how policy entrepreneurs in other domains—such as climate change, healthcare, or labor policy—can challenge entrenched interests.
You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at
Finger, Leslie K. 2024. “ Advocacy Groups, Policy Subsidies, and Policy Change: The Case of Teacher Evaluations.” Policy Studies Journal 52 (4): 777–808. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12538.
About the Author
Leslie K. Finger is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. Her research focuses on interest groups, policymaking, and state and local politics with a focus on education policy. Her work has appeared in various journals, including Perspectives on Politics, Governance, Policy Studies Journal, Interest Groups & Advocacy, American Politics Research, and State Politics & Policy.
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