Tag: immigration policy

Immigration, Government Type, and Social Welfare Spending

by Hang Qi

Immigration and the welfare state are often cast as adversaries in political debates. When immigration increases, concerns about overburdened social services frequently rise to the surface—especially during times of fiscal constraint. But is the relationship really that simple?

In my recent article, I argue that this question cannot be adequately answered without considering the role of the institutional framework and arrangements—specifically, the type of government in power.

Drawing on panel data from 28 advanced democracies between 1980 and 2019, I examine how immigration inflows interact with government types—single-party majority, coalition, and minority governments—to influence welfare spending. My findings show that the relationship between immigration and social expenditure is not uniform. While immigration alone does not have a consistent effect on welfare spending, its impact is significantly shaped by the type of government.

Coalition and minority governments – where power is more dispersed – are more likely to respond to immigration with increased welfare spending. This contrasts with single-party majority governments, which tend to be more cautious or even restrictive. The reasons are both institutional and political. In more fragmented governments, there are numerous veto players, and accountability is shared. This can shield pro-welfare and pro-immigration parties from electoral risks and dilute the policy influence of anti-immigrant sentiment.

By contrast, single-party majority governments, especially under growing public concern about immigration, may face stronger incentives to hold down spending. Parties in such governments are more directly accountable for all policy outcomes and may be wary of appearing “soft” on immigration in the eyes of median voters.

Real-world cases underscore these dynamics. In France, left parties in coalition governments have actively defended immigrants’ access to healthcare, despite political resistance. Meanwhile, in Denmark and the U.S., left-leaning single-party governments have in some instances moderated or even reversed their immigration-friendly positions in response to electoral pressure.

These findings illustrate a broader lesson: institutions matter. Political institutions determine how the government responds to social pressures and also condition whether immigration leads to policy expansion or retrenchment. Understanding these institutional filters is crucial for designing sustainable and inclusive social welfare policies in an era of increasing migration and political polarization.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Qi, Hang. 2025. “ Immigration, Government Type, and Social Welfare Spending.” Policy Studies Journal 00(0): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70015.

About the Author

Hang Qi is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau. His research focuses on the policy and politics of redistribution, immigration policy, fiscal policy, and political economy. His work has been published or is forthcoming in Policy Studies Journal, Public Opinion Quarterly, American Politics Research, and other journals.

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Intergovernmental Implementation in a Time of Uncooperative Federalism: Immigration Enforcement and Federal Secure Communities Program, 2011–14

by William D. Schreckhise & Daniel E. Chand

On the first day of his second term, Present Trump signed an executive order taking aim at “so-called sanctuary jurisdictions,” marking his latest attempt to step up immigration enforcement in progressive, pro-immigrant communities. While there’s no universal definition as to what constitutes “sanctuary” jurisdictions, the most accepted definition are communities that limit state and local law enforcement participation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), enforcement program known as Secure Communities (S-Comm).

S-Comm is, essentially, a nationwide immigration screening program. It has long been commonplace for jails to share an individual’s name and biometric information (e.g., photo, fingerprints, etc.) with federal authorities to see if the person has a criminal record or any outstanding warrants when an individual is arrested and booked. S-Comm further shares this information with ICE, which screens the individual for immigration violations.

If ICE suspects an individual of being in the country without proper authorization, it can issue an ICE detainer, which requests the jail to hold the individual for up to 48 hours so that ICE can take custody of the person and begin deportation proceedings. ICE can, and frequently does, detain individuals under S-Comm regardless of whether the charges for the original arrest are dropped. From the time S-Comm became nationwide operational in 2013 through 2020, roughly 700,00 individuals were removed from the country.

S-Comm was (and still is) controversial. Numerous local governments, mostly counties, have passed various measures in opposition to the program. Other governments went further, explicitly prohibiting their officers from contacting ICE and prohibiting their agencies from spending money in ways that otherwise could help ICE. However, other governments essentially did the opposite with some states requiring their counties to honor ICE detainer requests.

In our PSJ article, we examined the extent to which state and local governments play a role in implementing federal policy, focusing on the patterns of interaction between federal actors and nonfederal actors implementing S-Comm. Specifically, we examine the extent to which localities and states could hinder or help with the program’s implementation.

To determine what role these subnational policies could play, we collected county-level ICE removal data and information about which states and localities adopted policies aimed at either helping ICE by mandating their agencies honor detainer requests or hindering ICE’s efforts prohibiting that they cooperate with ICE’s detainer requests.

We found that states and counties can indeed play a prominent role. Taking these various other factors into account, counties that passed so-called “sanctuary” ordinances saw roughly 30% fewer deportations. Counties in states that had passed their own state-level “sanctuary” laws saw a similar decline. States that passed legislation requiring their localities to cooperate with ICE saw 44% more deportations.

We also wanted to determine to what extent the presence of the cooperative and noncooperative policies was reflected in what ICE itself was doing. It is one thing for counties and states to simply refuse to cooperate; it is entirely another for ICE to modify its own behavior because of these policies. To do this, we redirected the variables to determine whether they could help explain the extent to which ICE was making detainer requests in the first place. Again, we found that ICE was making fewer detainer requests in states and counties where cooperation with ICE was prohibited and making more in states where the counties were directed to cooperate.

Considering the ongoing debate over immigration enforcement policies, our findings underscore the significant impact of state and local policies on the implementation of federal initiatives, like S-Comm. The presence of subnational policies not only shape the outcome of the policy, but also how the federal agencies, like ICE, behave when implementing federal programs.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Schreckhise, W.D. and Chand, D.E. (2021), Intergovernmental Implementation in a Time of Uncooperative Federalism: Immigration Enforcement and Federal Secure Communities Program, 2011–14. Policy Stud J, 49: 1160-1188. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12426

About the Authors

William D. Schreckhise is professor in the University of Arkansas’ Department of Political Science. He earned his Ph.D. from Washington State University’s Department of Political Science. His research interests include policy implementation and bureaucratic discretion. His the author of Evaluating American Democracy and Public Policy.


Daniel E. Chand (“Danny”) received his Ph.D. in Public Policy in the Policy Management specialization at the University of Arkansas. His research focuses on the implementation of immigration policy, examining the roles of actors such as immigrant-serving nonprofits, immigration judges, and ICE officers. In addition to PSJ, his work has appeared in journals like Policy Sciences and Voluntas.

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