Tag: local government

Partisan Collaboration in Policy Adoption: An Experimental Study With Local Government Officials

by Yixin Liu

Collaboration among local governments is crucial for tackling shared challenges like environmental management and economic development. Partisanship significantly shapes these collaborative efforts. In my recent paper, I investigate how partisanship affects local policymakers’ decisions to collaborate and whether political identity moderates the importance of key collaborative attributes like resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and policy outcomes. This work bridges gaps in the existing collaborative strategies literature by focusing on individual-level preferences rather than aggregated patterns.

This study sought to address two primary research questions:  

(1) Does partisanship influence local policymakers’ willingness to adopt collaborative sustainable development programs?  

(2) Does partisanship alter how policymakers weigh other collaborative attributes, such as trust or resource sharing, in their decision-making?  

To test these questions, I designed a conjoint experiment targeting municipal officials across the United States. Participants were asked to evaluate hypothetical sustainable development programs proposed by cities with varying partisanship and collaborative attributes—such as the balance of resource contributions (resource allocation), the expected number of jobs created by the program (policy outcome), and past collaborations with the partner city (reciprocal trust). By randomizing these attributes, I was able to isolate the effect of partisanship while controlling for other factors.  

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The sample included 772 local government officials, representing a broad cross-section of U.S. municipalities. These officials represented 535 municipalities and covered offices from 49 states and the District of Columbia. I used my data to test two hypotheses:

Co-­partisanship Hypothesis (H1): The collaborative program proposed by co-partisans will increase the interest of municipal officials in adopting it, compared to the same program proposed by out-­partisans.

Conditional hypothesis (H2): The importance of resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and policy outcomes will weaken if the collaborative program is not proposed by co-­partisans.

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The co-partisanship effect was clear: Programs proposed by co-partisans were 12.75 percentage points more likely to be adopted than those proposed by out-partisans, supporting H1 (see Figure 2). Moreover, my analysis yielded support for H2. My results showed that the influence of collaborative attributes was indeed conditional on whether it was proposed by a co-partisan. For example, respondents favored programs that required lower resource contributions or had higher job creation potential, but these attributes were weighed less heavily when the proposal was made by a partner city in the out-party (see Figure 3). It is also important to note that the influence of partisanship was consistent across subgroups, suggesting its deep roots in political identity rather than professional roles or ideologies.

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This study highlights the importance of understanding the role of partisanship in collaborative governance. Future research could explore the long-term impacts of partisanship on collaborative governance or expand the scope to other policy areas. Additionally, combining experimental methods with observational data could enhance our understanding of how partisan dynamics evolve over time in real-world settings.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Liu, Yixin. 2024. “ Partisan Collaboration in Policy Adoption: An Experimental Study With Local Government Officials.” Policy Studies Journal 52(4): 955–967. https://doi-org.echo.louisville.edu/10.1111/psj.12551.

About the Author

Yixin Liu is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics & International Affairs at Northern Arizona University. His research investigates cross-sectoral collaborative governance in environmental management. Prior to joining NAU, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He completed his PhD at Florida State University.

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How do public policies diffuse, and how can diffusion processes be actively governed without direct coercion?

by Kai Schulze

Diffusion has emerged as an important concept for studying how public policies spread across jurisdictions. Scholars have identified several mechanisms that drive policy diffusion, including learning, competition, emulation, and coercion. At the same time, policy diffusion is also a popular governance approach, particularly for higher levels of government that want to promote certain policies at lower levels, but do not want to or cannot mandate policy action. However, the governance potential of policy diffusion is poorly captured by the prevailing mechanism-centered concept, which is difficult to measure and typically emphasizes direct coercion or “hard” interventions, such as preemptive legislation or conditional funding. It therefore risks overlooking important less coercive or “soft” interventions that higher levels of government can use to promote policy development at lower levels. 

This neglect of soft interventions limits the analytical value of the diffusion concept, especially in multilevel environments with varying levels of authority and in policy areas where direct coercion is unavailable or undesirable, including in climate policy. For example, in many countries, higher levels of government lack the constitutional authority to mandate local climate action, or local authorities lack the capacity to comply with such mandates, so they resort to various interventions that are scattered throughout the literature but have not yet been compared more systematically.

To address these issues, I present a new channel-centered framework that distinguishes between six soft policy diffusion channels that can be broadly placed on a continuum of coerciveness or state intervention: autonomous, collaborative, exemplary, persuasive, organized, and funded diffusion (see Table 1). Autonomous diffusion refers to voluntary and noninstitutionalized exchanges between jurisdictions at the same level of government, collaborative diffusion to the bottom-up creation of formal networks, exemplary diffusion to policy development by higher-level governments to set an example, persuasive diffusion to the provision of informational resources, organized diffusion to networks created by higher-level governments, and funded diffusion to financial incentives and the provision of additional resources.    

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I probe the framework by studying local climate change adaptation policy using original survey data collected from the administrations of 190 municipalities located in the central German state of Hessen. The regression results indicate that the local institutionalization of adaptation in Hessen such as the development of adaptation plans and new staff dealing with adaptation is associated with several interventions by higher levels of government, including the provision of a policy model, a municipal climate network, and grant programs. However, the density of concrete adaptation measures–such as the creation of open-air corridors, education programs, drainage and retention areas, and surface unsealing–is associated with noninstitutionalized exchanges between municipalities. These results demonstrate the usefulness of the framework for distinguishing and comparing different diffusion channels and thus for understanding policy diffusion as a governance approach. In particular, the results suggest that different types of interventions may be needed to support adaptation policy development at the local level. This is important information for the efficient allocation of scarce (local) resources and for policymakers seeking to capitalize on policy diffusion.

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

Schulze, Kai. 2024. “ The Soft Channels of Policy Diffusion: Insights From Local Climate Change Adaptation Policy.” Policy Studies Journal 52(4): 881–906. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12555.

About the Author

Kai Schulze is an Adjunct Professor with the Institute of Political Science at the Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany leading the Junior Research Group on Integrated Systems Analysis. His research focuses on comparative public policy and politics, particularly in the fields of energy, climate, and environment. His work has appeared in journals such as Climate Policy, European Journal of Political Research, Global Environmental Politics, Regional Environmental Change, Regulation & Governance, Review of Policy Research, WIREs Climate Change.

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The Policy Feedback Effects of Preemption

by Mallory E. SoRelle & Allegra H. Fullerton

Preemption has become a powerful tool for policymakers to disrupt policymaking at lower levels of government and consolidate governing authority. It occurs when a higher level of government enacts laws that override or limit the authority of lower levels of government. The federal government can preempt state governments; likewise, state governments can preempt local governments. This tactic can prevent local governments from implementing their own regulations on issues like public health, labor rights, and civil rights, leading to a centralization of power and often stifling local innovation and responsiveness.

Existing scholarship on preemption has focused on explaining its causes. Very little research has investigated the consequences of preemptive policies for policymaking and governance. In our paper, we develop a theoretical framework to examine these effects systematically, focusing on the lasting impacts of preemption on political engagement, policy innovation, and public trust. 

In developing this framework, we expand on policy feedback theory, which examines how policies, once enacted, can influence future political behavior and policy development. Feedback occurs through two mechanisms: resource effects and interpretive effects. The former includes the effects that influence the capacity of actors to participate in politics by changing access to resources (i.e., monetary, education, civic skills, etc.). The latter includes the effects that shape values and attitudes associated with a policy that influence policy preferences and political actions. We suggest ways of analyzing the resource and interpretive feedback effects of preemption on policymakers, interest groups, and individuals (see Table 1).

We apply the framework to two cases. First, we discuss federal preemption of consumer financial protections. When the federal government overrides state-level protections, consumers may lose trust in their ability to influence financial regulations, and state policymakers may become less inclined to innovate or push for stronger consumer protections. This centralization of power can also empower certain interest groups while weakening others, leading to a shift in the political landscape.

Next, we analyze the consequences of state preemption of municipal anti-discrimination ordinances, particularly in the context of LGBTQ+ rights. When states pass laws that prevent cities from enacting their own anti-discrimination measures, this preemption can stifle innovation and reduce the capacity of local governments to respond to their constituents’ needs. For LGBTQ+ individuals, these laws can lead to worsened health outcomes, decreased political efficacy, and a diminished sense of belonging, as the state sends a clear message about whose rights are prioritized.

This article highlights the significant and far-reaching impacts of preemption on politics, and it proposes a research agenda for future scholarship on the feedback effects of this common policy tool. By understanding how preemption shapes political behavior, policy development, and social attitudes, scholars and policymakers can better navigate the complexities of federalism and work towards more equitable and responsive governance. 

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at

SoRelle, Mallory E. and Allegra H. Fullerton 2024. “ The Policy Feedback Effects of Preemption.” Policy Studies Journal 52 (2): 235–255. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12528.

About the Authors

Mallory SoRelle is an Assistant Professor at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. Her research and teaching explore how public policies are produced by, and critically how they reproduce, socioeconomic and political inequality in the United States. She focuses primarily on issues like consumer financial protection and access to civil justice that fundamentally shape the welfare of marginalized communities yet are often overlooked by scholars of the welfare state because they are not traditional redistributive programs. Mallory is the author of Democracy Declined: The Failed Politics of Consumer Financial Protection (University of Chicago Press, 2020), which explores the political response—by policymakers, public interest groups, and ordinary Americans—to one of the most consequential economic policy issues in the United States: consumer credit and financial regulation.

Allegra H. Fullerton is a PhD Candidate at the University of Colorado Denver School of Public Affairs. The bulk of her research examines the intricate relationships between emotions, beliefs, and coalition dynamics within marginalized communities. She has published in Policy Studies Journal, Review of Policy Research, International Review of Public Policy, and more on gender policy, policy feedback in the US and Germany, transgender healthcare, power, and policy learning. She teaches courses on policy processes and democracy, as well as negotiation. She sits on the organizing committee for the Conference on Policy Process Research, a community dedicated to advancing policy process theories and methods internationally. She also serves as the Digital Associate Editor at Policy and Politics.

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The Adoption of Culturally Contentious Innovations: The Case of Citizen Oversight of Police

by Mir Usman Ali

The deaths of George Floyd and Broenna Taylor at the hands of police in 2020 brought the issue of police accountability to the forefront of public debate. One reform that has been a long-standing demand of police accountability advocates is Citizen Oversight Agencies (COAs). COAs are institutional arrangements at the local level that provide a platform for non-sworn review complaints about the police. While there is growing scholarly interest in these agencies, little research has examined factors associated with their adoption. In this paper, I use innovation diffusion theory to help fill this gap. 

In particular, I investigate the role of cultural contentiousness, a previously understudied concept. When an innovation is culturally contentious, it challenges an existing institution’s dominant cultural meaning, leading to resistance. I argue that COAs are culturally contentious because they highlight the disconnect between the race- and class-neutral way police are supposed to perform their role in a liberal-capitalist society and the non-neutral way in which they actually perform it. Moreover, I argue that investigative COAs (i.e., COAs that can independently investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend discipline) are more contentious than non-investigative COAs (which merely review or monitor police investigations of citizen complaints) because the former can be viewed as undermining the professional autonomy of the police.

To identify the factors associated with the adoption and diffusion of COAs at the municipal level in the United States between 1980 and 2016, I assembled a panel data set of all cities with a population greater than 100,000 persons as of 2010. There were 77 municipalities with COAs and 154 municipalities without COAs that met the criteria for inclusion in the study. I used event history modeling (EHM) to estimate the impact of various antecedents on the likelihood of adoption and diffusion of COAs. 

Results indicate that a federal investigation or entering a consent decree, an increase in the number of civil rights nonprofits, or an increase in own-source revenue per capita was associated with the adoption of investigative COAs, while not being associated with non-investigative COAs. These findings underscore the importance of antecedents that reveal contradictions between cultural assumptions and non-neutral material effects of policing.

I also find that antecedents that symbolically obfuscate the above contradiction, or whose meaning is unclear, tend to reduce the likelihood of adoption of COAs overall or increase the likelihood of adoption of non-investigative COAs. For instance, the presence of a Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR) law, an increase in the violent crime rate, or an increase in the number of neighboring cities with a COA either increased the likelihood of adopting a non-investigative COA or no COA at all.

In summary, this work highlights the importance of cultural contentiousness in innovation adoption and diffusion. While the results indicate that less culturally contentious change is more common, more contentious change does occur. However, for such change to be institutionalized, it needs to be supported by other levels of government and sustained advocacy efforts for police accountability. 

You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at 

Ali, M. U.. 2023. “The adoption of culturally contentious innovations: The case of citizen oversight of police.” Policy Studies Journal, 51, 905–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12499

About the Author

Mir Usman Ali is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland-Baltimore County. His research revolves around building a theory of the conditions under which public managers and organizations can foster social equity-enhancing institutional change. His research has looked at a variety of topics such as citizen oversight of police, impact of body-worn cameras, policies intended to curb domestic violence, and pandemic preparedness among local health departments. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Affairs Indiana University-Bloomington, an M.S. in Statistics from Texas A&M University, College Station and MBA and BBA degrees from the Institute of Business Administration, Karachi. His research has been published in Public Administration Review, Public Performance and Management Review, American Review of Public Administration, and Policy Studies Journal.

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