by Mallory E. SoRelle & Allegra H. Fullerton
Preemption has become a powerful tool for policymakers to disrupt policymaking at lower levels of government and consolidate governing authority. It occurs when a higher level of government enacts laws that override or limit the authority of lower levels of government. The federal government can preempt state governments; likewise, state governments can preempt local governments. This tactic can prevent local governments from implementing their own regulations on issues like public health, labor rights, and civil rights, leading to a centralization of power and often stifling local innovation and responsiveness.
Existing scholarship on preemption has focused on explaining its causes. Very little research has investigated the consequences of preemptive policies for policymaking and governance. In our paper, we develop a theoretical framework to examine these effects systematically, focusing on the lasting impacts of preemption on political engagement, policy innovation, and public trust.
In developing this framework, we expand on policy feedback theory, which examines how policies, once enacted, can influence future political behavior and policy development. Feedback occurs through two mechanisms: resource effects and interpretive effects. The former includes the effects that influence the capacity of actors to participate in politics by changing access to resources (i.e., monetary, education, civic skills, etc.). The latter includes the effects that shape values and attitudes associated with a policy that influence policy preferences and political actions. We suggest ways of analyzing the resource and interpretive feedback effects of preemption on policymakers, interest groups, and individuals (see Table 1).
We apply the framework to two cases. First, we discuss federal preemption of consumer financial protections. When the federal government overrides state-level protections, consumers may lose trust in their ability to influence financial regulations, and state policymakers may become less inclined to innovate or push for stronger consumer protections. This centralization of power can also empower certain interest groups while weakening others, leading to a shift in the political landscape.
Next, we analyze the consequences of state preemption of municipal anti-discrimination ordinances, particularly in the context of LGBTQ+ rights. When states pass laws that prevent cities from enacting their own anti-discrimination measures, this preemption can stifle innovation and reduce the capacity of local governments to respond to their constituents’ needs. For LGBTQ+ individuals, these laws can lead to worsened health outcomes, decreased political efficacy, and a diminished sense of belonging, as the state sends a clear message about whose rights are prioritized.
This article highlights the significant and far-reaching impacts of preemption on politics, and it proposes a research agenda for future scholarship on the feedback effects of this common policy tool. By understanding how preemption shapes political behavior, policy development, and social attitudes, scholars and policymakers can better navigate the complexities of federalism and work towards more equitable and responsive governance.
You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at
SoRelle, Mallory E. and Allegra H. Fullerton 2024. “ The Policy Feedback Effects of Preemption.” Policy Studies Journal 52 (2): 235–255. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12528.
About the Authors
Mallory SoRelle is an Assistant Professor at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. Her research and teaching explore how public policies are produced by, and critically how they reproduce, socioeconomic and political inequality in the United States. She focuses primarily on issues like consumer financial protection and access to civil justice that fundamentally shape the welfare of marginalized communities yet are often overlooked by scholars of the welfare state because they are not traditional redistributive programs. Mallory is the author of Democracy Declined: The Failed Politics of Consumer Financial Protection (University of Chicago Press, 2020), which explores the political response—by policymakers, public interest groups, and ordinary Americans—to one of the most consequential economic policy issues in the United States: consumer credit and financial regulation.
Allegra H. Fullerton is a PhD Candidate at the University of Colorado Denver School of Public Affairs. The bulk of her research examines the intricate relationships between emotions, beliefs, and coalition dynamics within marginalized communities. She has published in Policy Studies Journal, Review of Policy Research, International Review of Public Policy, and more on gender policy, policy feedback in the US and Germany, transgender healthcare, power, and policy learning. She teaches courses on policy processes and democracy, as well as negotiation. She sits on the organizing committee for the Conference on Policy Process Research, a community dedicated to advancing policy process theories and methods internationally. She also serves as the Digital Associate Editor at Policy and Politics.
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