by Oswaldo Mena Aguilar
In 2013, Mexico passed a sweeping tax reform that, surprisingly, included measures to increase taxes on the wealthiest individuals and corporations—despite being led by a party often aligned with elite economic interests. A decade earlier, under similar institutional conditions and with widespread support from the business sector, a far more modest reform effort had collapsed. What explains this contrast?
My article tackles this puzzle by comparing two major reform efforts: President Vicente Fox’s failed 2001 attempt and President Enrique Peña Nieto’s successful 2013 overhaul. Despite similar levels of party fragmentation and legislative constraints, the outcomes were drastically different—not only in terms of success, but also in ideological orientation.
To make sense of these differences, I assess two major policy process theories: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). The ACF suggests that lasting policy change results from coalitions of actors united by deep normative commitments. Yet in Mexico, such ideological coherence was absent in 2013. Instead, I argue that policy entrepreneurs took advantage of fleeting political windows—exemplifying the kind of opportunistic “coupling of streams” Kingdon describes.
In 2001, Fox’s proposal to extend the Value Added Tax (VAT) to basic goods failed because the PRI—then the main opposition party—refused to pay the political cost, despite sharing the PAN’s economic preferences. And yet, the Income Tax portion of that bill passed unanimously, after PRD legislators accepted corporate-friendly provisions in exchange for key progressive concessions. This trade-off exemplified a strategic, if ideologically messy, compromise enabled by a temporary alignment of interests.
Fast forward to 2013, when PRI, back in power, launched a tax reform that defied expectations: it dropped controversial VAT expansions and instead raised income and capital taxes on top earners. The reform succeeded not due to ideological conviction, but because it was part of a broader legislative package negotiated under the “Pacto por México.” PRI’s flexibility—along with the PRD’s willingness to strike a deal—made it possible to capitalize on a narrow legislative opportunity.
This case shows that policy change—even in rigid institutional environments—does not always reflect stable coalitions or shared beliefs. Sometimes, it’s about seizing the moment.
You can read the original article in Policy Studies Journal at
Mena Aguilar, Oswaldo A. 2024. “ Advocacy Coalitions or Pragmatic Coupling of Streams? Explaining Policy Change in Mexico: The Tax Reforms of Vicente Fox and Enrique Peña (2001 and 2013).” Policy Studies Journal 00 (0): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12537.
About the Author

Oswaldo A. Mena is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His research focuses on comparative politics, political economy, and the political determinants of inequality, poverty, and redistributive politics and policies in Latin America. He is a Data Research Fellow at the Center for Latin American, Caribbean, and Latino Studies and was a 2024 Junior Scholar of the Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality. He previously worked in Mexico’s public sector for nearly a decade.
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